Telegraph, Media, and State Information Capacity: Evidence from Late Imperial China
Abstract
The impact of modern information technology on state capacity is relatively under-researched. Most literature on state capacity in the pre-modern context focus on the "extractive" side rather than the "expenditure" side. In addition, little is known about the role of private media in historical state building. This paper explores the introduction of the telegraph in the late 19th-century China, the purpose of which were mostly military, to quantify the impact of information technology on state's capacity to obtain local information about natural disasters and to provide famine relief. The results show that telegraph connection increased the probability of officials' disaster reporting by 0.36 percentage points (31% of the mean of the dependent variable). It also improved the accuracy of reported information. Furthermore, the telegraph enhanced the capacity of private media to collect, transmit, and disseminate local information, thereby pressuring local officials to report disasters more truthfully. The impact was stronger in cases with competing information channels within state institutions and greater opportunity costs of misreporting. As a result, the telegraph improved public good provisions, stabilized grain prices, and mitigated social unrest. This paper underscores the complementarity between technology and institutions by showing how telegraph activated multiple informational channels internal and external to the bureaucracy.
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