Matriarch for the Patriarch: Female Regency, Two-Sided Commitment and Political Stability in Historical China
Keywords:
historical political economy, political succession, regency, autocracy, genderAbstract
Political succession in authoritarian regimes is perilous. An under-explored aspect of this challenge is the conflict of interest between new leaders and the ruling coalition they inherit from their predecessor right after the transition of power. We theorize that such conflict arises from two-sided commitment problems: the ruling elites cannot credibly commit to relinquishing power when the leader seeks to centralize it; and once in power, the leader cannot credibly guarantee to not purging the elites. We examine the ruler-regent relationship in historical China, where these issues were most pronounced. Using original data on minor emperors and regents, we show that female regents, who were culturally protected from political purges but also discouraged from seizing power, can mitigate the two-sided commitment problems and enhance political stability for the young emperor. Our findings underscore the importance of institutional constraints on incumbent elites in overcoming early leadership challenges, thereby ensuring a smoother transition of authority and long-term political survival for the ruler.
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